COMMENTARY
 

Sustaining gains in internal security
By Gen. Alexander Yano
Chief of Staff
Armed Forces of the Philippines

We have seen positive developments in Central Mindanao. The AFP remains supportive of the ongoing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). We are confident that with the anticipated resumption of the peace talks, a negotiated political settlement will soon be reached.

For the AFP, the ceasefire is a window of opportunity to pursue non-combat initiatives and bring development into MILF-influenced barangays and in turn, bring the people closer to government. We have seen an increase of MILF surrenderees, most of whom were beneficiaries of comprehensive programs to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate into society former MILF members. Nearly all of the 460 firearms recovered from the MILF in 2007 came from surrenderees.
We believe that violence is not the best way to attain lasting peace. Violence begets violence.

However, we find it very unfortunate that we experienced a spike in MILF-initiated incidents in recent months. They are responsible for a total of forty (40) incidents from May 01 to June 30 alone, including ambuscades, raids, harassments and eight (8) sabotage operations against Transco towers and power-generating facilities.
Thus, while I reiterate the primacy of the peace process even in the light of increasing attacks by the MILF, we shall maintain an active defense posture consistent with our non-negotiable mandate to preserve peace. It is our primary role to ensure the security of our people and communities. Therefore, should there be any individual or group who would disrupt peace and threaten to harm the Filipino people, the AFP will not hesitate to use force in order to subdue them, restore peace and secure the Filipino people. Consistent with our Commander-in-Chief’s directive, I direct the AFP to be vigilant and take appropriate actions, while upholding the primacy of the peace process, to protect the people against those who disrupt the peace.

The AFP units in Central Mindanao are capable of performing their three-fold task of containing the 11,765 fighters of the MILF in their areas of temporary stay, bring developmental projects into our communities in Mindanao, and support other government agencies. In the upcoming ARMM elections, some AFP units have been deputized by the COMELEC to help ensure peaceful elections. Furthermore, should there be conflict in Mindanao, the AFP stands ready to respond and ensure that hostilities are contained and swiftly resolved.
 

Dealing with finality

As regards the terrorist threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group, this has continually diminished as shown in the absence of high-profile attacks in urban areas. Combat operations, specifically those conducted under Oplan Ultimatum, have degraded the ASG’s armed capabilities. We have also cut off its links from foreign terrorist groups, denying it financial, training, and logistics support. Until now, the group has yet to recover from its leadership vacuum since the death of its leader Khadaffy Janjalani, degenerating into a mere bandit group bereft of any ideological foundation and motivated solely by money.

The AFP believes that our local communities are now rejecting the Abu Sayyaf. Their havens are now limited to remote, isolated areas of Jolo and Basilan where close kin reside. Waning popular support for the groups can be traced to AFP developmental initiatives through Oplan Kaunlaran, which involves the construction of basic infrastructure and the provisions of social services.

Your AFP is also an active participant in the Heath, Education, Livelihood for Progress (HELP) Humanitarian Caravan of the Office of the Presidential Adviser in the Peace Process. HELP aims to usher the convergent delivery of social and economic services to communities affected by conflict in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. These projects have addressed quality-of-life issues. This has denied the ASG issues with which to entice new members.
 
Initially, the recent kidnapping incident in Sulu has thrust the ASG into the headlines. However, the incident failed to translate to a resurgence of the group. In fact, it proved to be counter-productive since it was a grave manifestation of the group’s weaknesses. Unlike in previous kidnappings perpetrated by the group, which were orchestrated by a clear leadership, the recent kidnapping was undertaken by young members, without central coordination. This explains why the situation was resolved in a relatively short period of time. The fact that main efforts in resolving the situation came from the PNP, with the AFP only playing a support role, is indicative of the fact that this was merely a local peace and order problem.

Nonetheless, the AFP has continued to keep the pressure on the group. The ASG’s freedom of movement has been constrained by initiatives such as the Coast Watch South. Increase in naval forces in the Sulu Sea have rendered them incapable of operating in a maritime environment. I have also ordered intelligence-driven small unit operations against the group to ensure it is dealt with finality. These operations are conducted by small, highly trained units that act decisively and swiftly to ensure that the operations do not disrupt communities.

Moving closer to 2010

Your AFP has been posting similar positive gains in its efforts against the armed local communist movement. You are aware that the communist insurgents are in a continuous decline – both in strength and influence. Their number of members is at an all time historical low of 5,379-- only around 21.3% of their peak membership of 25,200 in 1987.
 
Similarly, their influence is waning, with their presence seen in only 1,615 barangays or 3.8% of the country’s 41,995 barangays. The number of their guerilla fronts, which peaked in 2005 at 107 fronts has also been scaled down to only 67 fronts.

Allow me to recount how we have achieved our gains. Foremost is our sustained military operations and focus on further diminishing the armed capability of the communist insurgents. To illustrate, our recent operations resulted in the capture of the headquarters of the insurgents’ North Central Mindanao Regional Committee (NCMRC) in Bukidnon. We were also able to recover landmines, high powered firearms, and sacks of bomb-making materials. We have also been actively seeking out the arms cache of the rebels, recovering high-powered firearms and other war materiel. In fact, we have already reduced the insurgency’s arms by 176 firearms for the 1st semester of this year. These combined operations are resulting in leadership vacuums in several guerilla fronts, mass base loss, financial difficulties, and ultimately, lower armed capabilities.

We could not have achieved as much if we relied on the traditional "military solution" alone, that is, fighting arms with arms. Thus, we have sought to redefine "military solution" and fuse this into the overall whole-of-government response to insurgency. When I say redefining the military solution, I am talking about adding to the equation the AFP’s developmental offensives.

You have heard of our National Development Support Command, which is primarily tasked to "undertake basic infrastructure works, livelihood activities and other development projects…in conflict, underdeveloped and depressed areas". You are aware of our Kalayaan Barangays Program, which aims to transform conflict-affected barangays into model communities of development.

We have already completed 357 short-gestation, high-impact projects such as the construction of school buildings, access roads, and water systems. We launch these "offensives" because we know that there is a symbiotic relationship between security and development. Bringing development into our communities encourages our people to reject armed groups. Our people know that they are stakeholders to peace and development and they shun groups that threaten their community. People are turning against the communist insurgency, creating unfavorable environments for the rebels.

Another important factor to our success is that a military solution gives precedence to a peaceful solution. Localized peace processes are given importance by our commanders on the ground. This has resulted in an increase in the number of rebel surrenderees over the past months. The decline in their numbers is not only an effect of sustained military operations. It is also a manifestation of the number of rebels turning away from the local communist movement.
(Excerpts from General Yano’s speech he delivered before the Manila Overseas Press Club on July 8, 2008)

 

VIEWS FROM OVERSEAS
Little Crimes Get Punished, Big Ones Don't
(War Crimes Paradox)
By PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS

National Public Radio has been spending much news time on Darfur in Western Sudan where a great deal of human suffering and death are occurring. The military conflict has been brought on in part by climate change, according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Drought is forcing nomads in search of water into areas occupied by other claimants. No doubt the conflict is tribal and racial as well. The entire catastrophe is overseen by a government with few resources other than bullets.
Now an International Criminal Court prosecutor wants to bring charges against Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.
I have no sympathy for people who make others suffer. Nevertheless, I wonder at the International Criminal Court’s pick from the assortment of war criminals? Why al-Bashir?

Is it because Sudan is a powerless state, and the International Criminal Court hasn’t the courage to name George W. Bush and Tony Blair as war criminals?
Bush and Blair’s crimes against humanity in Iraq and Afghanistan dwarf, at least in the number of deaths and displaced persons, the terrible situation in Darfur. The highest estimate of Darfur casualties is 400,000, one-third the number of Iraqis who have died as a result of Bush’s invasion. Moreover, the conflict in the Sudan is an internal one, whereas Bush illegally invaded two foreign countries, war crimes under the Nuremberg Standard. Bush’s war crimes were enabled by the political leaders of the UK, Spain, Canada, and Australia. The leaders of every member of the “coalition of the willing to commit war crimes” are candidates for the dock.
But of course the Great Moral West does not commit war crimes. War crimes are charges fobbed off on people demonized by the Western media, such as the Serbian Milosovic and the Sudanese al-Bashir.

Every week the Israeli government evicts Palestinians from their homes, steals their land, and kills Palestinian women and children. These crimes against humanity have been going on for decades. Except for a few Israeli human rights organizations, no one complains about it. Palestinians are defined as “terrorists,” and “terrorists” can be treated inhumanely without complaint.

Iraqis and Afghans suffer the same fate. Iraqis who resist US occupation of their country are “terrorists.” Taliban is a demonized name. Every Afghan killed--even those attending wedding parties--is claimed to be Taliban by the US military. Iraqis and Afghans can be murdered at will by American and NATO troops without anyone raising human rights issues.

The International Criminal Court is a bureaucracy. It has a budget, and it needs to do something to justify its budget. Lacking teeth and courage, it goes after the petty war criminals and leaves the big ones alone.

Don’t get me wrong. I’m for holding all governments accountable for their criminal actions. It is the hypocrisy to which I object. The West gives itself and Israel a pass while damning everyone else. Even human rights groups fall into the trap. Rights activists don’t see the buffoonery in their complaint that President Bush, who has violated more human rights than any person alive, is letting China off the hook for human rights abuses by attending the Olympics hosted by China.

President Bush claims that the enormous destruction and death he has brought to Iraq and Afghanistan are necessary in order for Americans to be safe. If we are accepting excuses this feeble, Milosovic passed muster with his excuse that as the head of state he was obliged to try to preserve the state’s territorial integrity. Is al-Bashir supposed to accept secession in the Sudan, something that Lincoln would not accept from the Confederacy? How long would al-Bashir last if he partitioned Sudan?
Last October the Atlanta Journal-Constitution had a photo on its front page above the fold of an elderly man with mikes shoved in his face. Paul Henss, 85 years old, is being deported from the US, where he has lived for 53 years, because Eli Rosenbaum, director the the US State Department’s Nazi-hunting bureaucracy, declared him a war criminal for training guard dogs used at German concentration camps. Henss was 22 years old when World War II ended.

A kid who trained guard dogs is being deported as a war criminal, but the head of state who launched two wars of naked aggression, resulting in the deaths of more than 1.2 million people, and who has the entire world on edge awaiting his third war of aggression, this time against Iran, is received respectfully by foreign governments. Corporations and trade associations will pay him $100,000 per speech when he leaves office. He will make millions of dollars more from memoirs written by a ghostwriter.
Does no one see the paradox of deporting Henss while leaving the war criminal in the White House?

(Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is co-author of The Tyranny of Good Intentions. He can be reached at: paulcraigroberts@yahoo.com)